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in place, which has translated into
“debilitating shortcomings” for German
military capabilities, despite having
an economy that truly has prospered
and will continue to do so (p. 66).
Deni sees France as the closest U.S.
ally in terms of strategic outlook; the
French hold views nearly identical to
Americans’ in these areas, and their
perspectives on the role of the military
as a foreign policy tool are similar
as well. But the author argues that
France’s foreign and military visions
cannot be sustained, owing to the
country’s inadequate economic growth.
Moreover, some political-sovereignty
issues still stand in the way of morefruitful interstate dialogue.
Among the allies examined, Italy
stands out as the one that has fallen the
furthest. Owing to a deeply troubled
economy and a backward environment
on technology and innovation—along
with the inability of political moderates
to face these challenges effectively,
which has resulted in the rise of populist
politicians—the Italian military is only
a shadow of what it once was, with the
likely prospect of additional languishing ahead. With an aging population
and a military that increasingly is
used as an internal dual-use security
force, Italy’s prospects as a meaningful
military ally continue to shrink.
Deni’s last study is devoted to Poland,
which, unlike nearly all other European
countries, has spent consistently and
meaningfully on defense over the entire
last decade. Russian military incursions
into Georgia, Crimea, and eastern
Ukraine, along with Russian military activities in Kaliningrad, build directly on
Poland’s historical fears of an aggressive
and expansionist Russia. Yet despite Poland’s economic strengths, new military
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capabilities, and legislation that requires
ongoing defense spending, it suffers a
severe limitation: its singular focus on
Russia, with its resultant investments in
territorial defense. This limits its ability
to partner with the United States.
The author concludes with several
recommendations for how to address
these significant shortcomings. Among
his proposals is sharing more American
military intelligence with allies, especially Germany, in an effort to increase
transparency on existing global threats
and challenges. Deni also recommends that the United States fully use
international organizations, including
the United Nations and NATO, given
the high strategic value the allies place
on them. And he encourages the United
States to support a strong European
security identity, which may help translate into greater defense spending, and
perhaps the development of specified
niche capabilities among the allies.
This book is impressive. Deni has used
an extensive body of scholarship and
data on each of these countries. He also
conducted a multitude of interviews
with both American and foreign
defense officials. While some of his
policy proposals certainly will generate
debate, his ideas are welcome, as they
provide some optimism that positive
change is possible and that policy
directions worth pursuing do exist.
RYAN C. HENDRICKSON
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This century’s increased social media
and other forms of technological
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sophistication has expanded what security
practitioners consider to be a domain
of conflict. In Dangerous Narratives,
Ajit Maan and his coauthors argue that
the cognitive and narrative domains of
conflict, if not always strategic centers of
gravity themselves, certainly have produced strategic effects on those centers.
Only recently, though, through a combination of information operations against
the United States and recent foreignpolicy failures, has the national-security
community recognized the growing
significance of this domain. Professionals,
researchers, and students interested in
the strategic, policy, and national-security
implications of how narratives can create
meaning will find Dangerous Narratives
a thought-provoking exploration of what
the future of conflict will look like.
Dangerous Narratives is a contributed volume by Dr. Ajit Maan and nine
additional security practitioners and
scholars, each of whom contributes a
chapter that develops Maan’s conceptual
foundations of “narrative identity theory”
and “narrative warfare”; together they
examine these concepts’ application to the
realms of kinetic warfare, strategy, history,
education, and law enforcement. Maan, a
narrative scholar and the chief executive
officer of Narrative Strategies (NS), a
consulting firm, introduces us to the
concept of narrative warfare: a struggle
not over the truth value of information
but over the meaning of information.
Even though research has shown the
importance of the narrative and cognitive
spaces in human behavior, Maan argues
that this knowledge is not being applied to
its fullest in the field of national security.
In section 1, Dr. Howard Gambrill Clark,
the president of NS and a counterextremism specialist, and Lieutenant Colonel
Brian L. Steed, USA (Ret.), associate

professor of military history at the U.S.
Army Command and General Staff
College, examine the seeming disconnect
between various narratives and their
associated kinetic conflicts. Drawing
on historical conflicts and the relevant
strategies of past military leaders, Clark
describes ways in which conflicts have
been and can be resolved through
nonkinetic means via narrative-led
subversion—the advantage of such a
strategy being that it is limited only by
an individual’s creativity. Steed artfully
translates the concept of the narrative
landscape by comparing it to a physical
one that can be eroded, controlled, and
exploited, in this case by actors and crafty
“narrative entrepreneurs” who use social
cleavages to gain a narrative advantage.
Section 2 features case studies and
analyses of weaponized narratives, both
past and present. Brigadier General Tom
Drohan, USAF (Ret.), professor emeritus
at the U.S. Air Force Academy, provides
two in-depth analyses, of China’s and of
Russia’s narrative strategies, including
how a well-designed narrative can target
opponents using Colonel John Boyd’s
observe-orient-decide-act (i.e., OODA)
loop—to disastrous effect. China’s
strategic use of information condenses
the observe and orient steps into one,
enabling faster decision-making and
more-predictable actions. Russian
narratives distort how a target orients
itself and influence its will and capacity to
observe, affecting how the target decides
and acts within the loop. Paul Cobaugh, a
retired Army warrant officer and specialoperations expert, imparts three insightful
personal learning experiences from his
deployments to Afghanistan. He explains
how identity, content, structure, and story
create a narrative, and how it can be used
strategically to advance successful military

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss4/21

2

B O O K R E V I E WS

Omichinski and Maan: Dangerous Narratives: Warfare, Strategy, Statecraft

operations. Dr. Aleksandra Nesic, a visiting faculty member at both the Army’s
John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center
and School and the Joint Special Operations University, closes out the section
with a fascinating exercise in historicalnarrative analysis of the 1389 Battle of
Kosovo, including how political elites in
Bosnia recontextualize and weaponize it
in different ways for strategic purposes.
The final section turns toward the
narrative’s effect on statecraft and stability.
Colonel Christopher Holshek, USA (Ret.),
critically assesses U.S. forces’ need to
institutionalize the effective training and
deployment of informational power via
a whole-of-nation strategy, citing the
success of the Marshall Plan in cultivating
a durable narrative in Europe against
the Soviet Union. Dr. Frank G. Straub,
director of the National Police Foundation’s Center for Mass Violence Response
Studies, follows with an assessment of
how narrative can influence police-citizen
relations. Through neighborhood-level
efforts at cooperative and communityinvolved policing, departments can use
narrative to build up trust and legitimacy
to better protect citizens. The book closes
with a cerebral, future-forward piece on
the predicted standardization of softpower theory through the “noosphere,”
written by retired RAND political scientist
Dr. David Ronfeldt and Naval Postgraduate School professor Dr. John Arquilla.
They argue that true soft power has been
misconceived and therefore does not have
the same breadth of theory for application
as is found for hard power, resulting in
the former’s underuse. They hypothesize
that the eventual development of education and training in “noopolitik” will be
critical for the strategists of the future.
Dangerous Narratives is an eclectic work
that covers a surprising range of topics
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that one might not consider at first glance
to be connected. The book is a testament
to the far-reaching interest that the
psychological and cognitive realms attract
across the field of national-security policy.
As I read each chapter, I consistently was
captivated by the diversity of thought that
such a specific conceptual framework
was able to generate. This no doubt was
because of the skill with which all the
authors took a deceptively complex
concept and, in their own terms and
in the context of their own experiences, described it clearly. The result
is an excellent introductory handbook
for the student-practitioner who seeks
to understand the impacts of narrative on national-security strategy.
NICK OMICHINSKI
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Today, the Boer War—or, more accurately,
the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–
1902)—is likely to be viewed as something
quaint and obsolete, a sepia-toned
daguerreotype from the waning Victorian
era. Lacking the gravitas that comes with
the antiquity of the Peloponnesians, its issues and lessons seem to have been swept
away by the industrialized, mass-produced
warfare of the twentieth century and a
general distaste for the conflicts of empire.
However, in its time the Boer War
riveted the attention of the British Empire
and, indeed, the world. Magnet-like,
the cockpit of conflict drew three very
different, particular Britons: Arthur
Conan Doyle, Rudyard Kipling, and
Mary Kingsley. All enjoyed some level
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